In addition, regulated credit institutions are very concerned about the sale of cross-delays, as this may influence their liquidity cushion calculations. Keep in mind the main security vulnerabilities against which the standard clause is supposed to protect: you see that this is totally absurd for a derivative master contract. This is a page on the general, generally stupid concept of the norms of the cross. In their infinite wisdom (or joke), the Brothers of the 1987 ISDA Monetary Interest and Exchange Agreement (cro-magnon-man of the hipster of the big city of ISDA of 2002) considered it wise to record a crossover failure, perhaps because, in these pioneering days, credit support annexes were not up to the task and may not even have been invented. Cross default is potentially a very damaging clause, as illustrated in detail in this image on the right. Or if there was an image on the right. To the extent that this is not the case: when a borrower negotiates a loan with a lender, there are several ways to mitigate the effects of the “crossdefault” and create financial flexibility. For example, a borrower may limit the cross-border statement to credits longer than one year or more than a certain amount in dollars. In addition, a borrower may negotiate a cross-acceleration scheme that must first occur before a cross-default in which a creditor must first expedite the payment of the principal owed and interest due before declaring a cross-default event. Finally, a borrower may limit contracts within the scope of the cross and exclude debts that are challenged in good faith or paid within the additional time allowed. Although “Crossdefault” clauses are often used in lending contracts between various financial institutions and individuals or corporations, it is not possible to include these clauses in agreements with public bodies. There are reasons why government agencies cannot enter into loan agreements with “cross-by-default” clauses.
First, the obligation on public bodies to take public action may prevent these institutions from fulfilling their contractual obligations under the loan agreement. Second, restrictions on the bugdets of public institutions and the non-independent structure of these institutions may deter them from freely fulfilling their contractual obligations. Finally, such intitutions, whose reputation is based on their solvency and solvency, do not want to be involved in such risky and incriminating agreements that could cause them to lose their solvency and solvency. In summary, “crossdefault” clauses are essential for debtors of loan contracts with respect to their function to prevent borrowers from often not complying with contractual obligations. However, as has already been mentioned, these clauses can lead to extremely disadvantaged situations for borrowers.